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Abstract 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) faces rising pressure in its efforts to maintain its position 
as a favored market of institutional fund managers and professional investors. Customers are 
satisfied with the current state of the LSE market, but member firms are pricing institutional 
brokerage and market making services below economic cost. The LSE's position will be 
significantly damaged when the effective subsidy ends, and commissions and dealing spreads 
reflect the costs incurred by members firms. Competition in the supply of trading services has 
increased, and a range of alternative, off-exchange trading systems could draw order flow away 
from the Exchange market. These trading mechanisms provide order matching, crossing of 
basket and portfolio trades, and reduce investors' commissions and trading spread costs. Fund 
managers in the U.S. are using the systems more actively, and the result has been an erosion 
of the position of the New York Stock Exchange. The LSE's customers are also using an 
expanding range of portfolio management techniques, many of which require low-cost trading, 
and do not demand immediate order execution, as traditionally provided by London's market 
makers. The Exchange needs to respond to the changes in fund managers' demand for trading 
services, and to the growing competition in the supply of off-exchange trading services. 
Enhancements to the existing LSE market structure are the best response to these threats. 
1. Introduction 
Financial markets are changing in many ways and the changes are pressuring established 
securities exchanges to adapt and change. The application of new fund management techniques, 
This paper was prepared with the financial support of the City Research Project, London 
Business School, and is based in part on interviews conducted between December 1991 and 
February 1992 in London and New York with institutional investors, securities brokers, stock 
exchange officials, and investment industry consultants. The authors agreed not to attribute 
interview comments to individuals or firms. 
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the increasing competitive pressure on fund managers for performance, and the availability of 
alternative off-exchange trading mechanisms are all transforming the needs of professional 
investors for trading services. Stock exchanges that fail to respond may find themselves 
threatened by an erosion of trading volume and deterioration of market quality. The position 
of London as a financial center is buttressed by the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) ability to 
provide high quality markets for domestic and international shares. If the LSE is not perceived 
as the highest quality market for U.K. equities, London's ability to attract trading in non-U.K. 
stocks and other financial instruments will quickly diminish. 
The LSE's greatest potential weakness is its reliance upon a single mechanism for trading 
at a time when alternative investment management approaches are flourishing, and investors' 
trading needs exhibit growing variation and segmentation. A competing market maker system 
is best suited to only a subset of investors' strategies. In recent years, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) has suffered a significant, measurable loss of market share in the trading of 
its listed stocks to off-exchange alternatives. The floor auction market has struggled to 
accommodate the demand from institutional investors for trading shares at minimum cost with 
a lower level of order disclosure and trade urgency, and for trading a number of securities at 
once. Since the NYSE has not accommodated these investor demands, a considerable portion 
of trading volume has moved off-exchange. 
Although trading volumes in the U.S. and the U.K. have resumed a gradual growth trend 
in 1990 and 1991, the ability of major exchanges to remain central markets in their listed 
securities is more precarious than ever. Investors are seeking greater international 
diversification, and exposure to more markets. They are making greater use of derivative 
instruments and are applying increasingly sophisticated methods to manage funds and control 
risk. A typical institution's reliance on any particular market or financial instrument continues 
to decrease. At the same time, deregulation has opened up market competition reducing 
brokerage commissions, and technology has made markets more transparent and dealers' pricing 
margins thinner. Mechanisms now exist for investors to bypass the Exchange and its member 
firms entirely and trade among themselves. One effect of competition has been to stimulate 
innovation by exchanges and their member firms. But because member firms' profits from 
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traditional market intermediation will probably never return to previous levels, exchanges will 
find their memberships less inclined to sacrifice privileges or profitable operations for the good 
of the market. Thus, changes to the Exchange's market structure should be carefully researched 
and justified to the Exchange community; member firms, investors, listed companies, and 
regulators will all want to understand the impact of any changes. 
Exchanges are moving in the direction of greater automation. At the time of Big Bang 
in 1986, the introduction of SEAQ led to the departure of traders from London's stock market 
floor to firms' well-equipped dealing rooms. The NYSE has spent $600 million on computer 
and communication equipment for order routing and handling in last 10 years. In spite of 
enhancements (or, perhaps because of them), seat prices (a barometer of the value of 
membership) have fallen nearly 75 % from $1.15 million in 1987 to $301,000 in September 
1990. 
Previously, most exchanges could rely on a geographically-defensible near-monopoly 
position in the trading of their listed securities. Information and communications technology, 
however, has opened many new methods of trading equities and other financial instruments. 
Viable alternatives to exchange-based markets now exist, and their use is growing as institutions' 
investment strategies change and they pursue lower-cost trading methods. The two factors 
forcing exchanges to act are: 
Competition in the Supply of Trading Services. Alternative trading mechanisms 
include cross-listings on overseas stock exchanges such as SEAQ International, cross-listing via 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), off-hours networks that "cross" buy and sell orders such 
as The Crossing Network and SPAWorks, and open quote display and order matching screens 
such as Instinet. These trading alternatives threaten to draw significant proportions of trading 
volume away from established exchange markets; as importantly, they limit what exchanges can 
charge for their services, since alternative sources now exist for these services. 
Changes in Demand for Trading Services. Developments in fund management, such 
as passive investing, indexation, and quantitative strategies have generated demand for new 
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approaches to trading. In many cases, investor trading needs have become less dependent upon 
the immediate execution of trading orders typically provided by member firm intermediaries in 
continuous markets on established exchanges. On the other hand, rapid access to price data has 
facilitated complex hedging and arbitrage trading strategies, which require more rapid, nearly 
instantaneous execution of trading orders. 
Esehange Competitiveness. In this environment - change and heightened competitive 
pressures - an exchange's survival depends its ability to attract investor customers and trading 
volume to its market. Exchanges will need to have a better understanding of investors' trading 
choices as more competing markets are available. Growing numbers of alternatives for trading 
will test the quality of an exchange's planning, and its ability to improve its trading mechanisms. 
The City of London has an interest in the success of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
Part of this concern should involve assessing the Exchange's ability to remain the central 
marketplace for U.K. securities, and to strengthen its position as a market in overseas securities 
and new financial instruments. The LXE provides noteworthy public goods such as regulatory 
and monitoring mechanisms to ensure fairness, the capacity to handle peak trading volumes, and 
the open discovery and dissemination of quotes and prices. The value of price information is 
large, and provides protection to participants in the market, as well as information about the 
market's appraisal of companies and stocks, which is useful for owners and managers throughout 
the economy. Although there are numerous beneficiaries of these public goods - no one can 
be excluded from "consuming" the public good - only those who use the LSE actually pay for 
the process of generating and distributing prices. The growth of alternative off-exchange trading 
systems, which often base their trades on the major market's prices, will make it increasingly 
difficult to recover the costs of providing the Exchange's public goods. Policy toward the 
Exchange should thus ensure that it continues to face fair competition, and that it has adequate 
incentives to perform its role as a marketplace and support its membership's ability to service 
investors. 
The long-term goal of the LSE should be to facilitate a broad and encompassing market 
that maximizes investor participation. Increasingly, this requires multiple trading mechanisms 
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to be provided to meet the emerging trading demands of institutional investors. Evidence is 
accumulating in the U.S. that investors will use alternative trading systems for low-cost, non- 
time-sensitive trades, and in cases where they do not want full disclosure of their trading 
intentions and prefer the anonymity of an order matching or crossing systems. Traditional 
market making and capital commitment will continue to have its place in London, but changing 
investment strategies and the specter of growing off-exchange trading volumes will ultimately 
require the LSE to enhance and augment its existing market design with facilities for limit order 
handling, passive order matching, and portfolio crossing. Integration of these trading 
mechanisms as part of the Exchange is preferable to erosion of order flow to off-exchange 
alternatives with associate loss of fairness, transparency, quality of price discovery, and careful 
regulatory oversight. The LSE faces significant long term threats; eventually it will stand at a 
crossroads similar to that faced in 1983 when the decision was made to develop SEAQ as an 
essential part of the 1986 market reforms. 
This report is organized into seven sections. The second section will review the literature 
on choice of market by investors. The third section describes the strength of the relationship 
between the LSE and investment institutions. Section four reports on the current range of 
trading mechanisms available to institutional investors, and details the experience of these 
systems in the U.S., where they have had the greatest impact. The fifth section describes the 
trends in fund management, and how they have led to new trading strategies for institutions. 
Section six outlines the threats to the LSE and London. Section seven gives our conclusions. 
2. Academic Literature 
Academic research on investors' choice among alternative markets is inconclusive. There 
are conflicting measures of market quality and thus different opinions on the ideal way to 
structure a market. Among the recognized criteria for market quality are liquidity, tightness, 
depth, resiliency, transparency, continuity, and access [KYLE85][COHE85][CMSW86] 
[CLEM89]. Liquidity is perhaps most important, but also the most difficult to measure. It 
represents an investor's ability to convert securities to cash and back again with minimal delay, 
and without an excessive effect on the price. Tightness is the size of the relative difference 
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between the market's buying quote @id) and its selling quote (offer). Depth is the quantity of 
shares available at or near the current market price. Resiliency is the market's ability to move 
quickly back to an equilibrating price after an imbalance in traders' demand or supply of the 
security. Transparency reflects the ability of a market participant to observe the trading and 
price discovery processes. Markets that are continuous enable investors to buy and sell at any 
time, rather than at specified times as with a call auction market. Access is the ability of 
investors to enter the marketplace and place buy and sell orders for themselves, rather than 
through an intermediary. 
The literature on investor trading decisions does not point to a single trading mechanism 
(eg., order-driven auction market, or a quote-driven dealer market) that is optimal for all 
investors, or using all measures of market quality. In fact, examining the choice between 
immediate execution against a bid or offer quote and waiting via limit orders for a more 
advantageous price, Handa and Schwartz (1991) found that immediate execution of trading 
orders (as generally occurs on the LSE) is "desirable for some but not all market participants". 
Clemons and Weber (1991) found that in comparison to a pure order matching system, many 
investors' transactions costs were lowered by the presence of a designated market maker, such 
as the NYSE specialist. 
Recent empirical work on comparative market quality, such as Pagano and Roell's (1990) 
work on dually traded securities on the Paris Bourse's continuous auction market and LSE's 
SEAQ International competing dealer market, found that the two competing markets imposed 
different transactions costs on investors. However, a direct comparison of the merits of the two 
market structures was impossible because market quotes were available for large trades in 
London and only for smaller share quantities in Paris. Furthermore, transactions costs for 
executed trades in an auction market need to reflect the opportunity cost of an extended 
negotiation or waiting period before the participant on the other side of the trade was found, 
whereas a dealer generally offers certain, immediate trading. 
Even when multiple markets are available for a single security, the likely outcome of 
multiple market competition is difficult to project. Several fragmented markets may exist for 
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securities, but individual incentives may not encourage a socially desirable consolidation of 
trading in a single, more liquid market [PAGA89][ECON88]. 
We find that the optimal design of trading mechanisms, and a stock market's response 
to competitive threats, remain empirical questions with only general indications available from 
the research literature. Since theory cannot recommend a single best market structure, the LSE 
faces trade-offs. We examined customer needs and interviewed Exchange users as a way of 
understanding these trade-offs and evaluating the market mechanism choices. The preferences 
of professional investors are most crucial since they make up seventy-five percent of the equities 
trading volume in London, and because they are most capable of trading in alternative markets. 
3. Exchanges and their Professional Customers 
Exchange markets generally have two classes of participants: members or member firms, 
who act as broker-agents and principal traders, and customers, who are either private clients or 
non-member fund management institutions that supply investment capital, manage portfolios, and 
use member firms of the exchange to execute trades. Member firms act as financial 
intermediaries and facilitate capital raising through underwriting, and contribute to secondary 
market liquidity by acting as agency brokers or as dealers trading against the public order flow. 
Historically, exchange memberships have conferred privileged access to the market and have had 
considerable franchise value. For instance, there are a fixed number of New York Stock 
Exchange membership seats (1,366), and at the peak in 1987, they sold for $1.15 million each. 
Institutional investors may manage in-house the assets of their organization, as in the case 
of an insurance company, or they may be agents for a sponsoring organization, such as a 
corporation's pension fund. In general, U.S. and U.K. institutions have had little operational 
contact with the exchanges, but have been served by the members of the exchange. They access 
the exchange markets through brokers and securities houses who charge a fee or a commission 
on trades. 
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Increasingly, institutions regard the selection of a trading mechanism as a way to enhance 
investment performance and to control costs. For instance, electronic crossing networks were 
introduced in the U.S. in 1986 as an alternative for institutional investors to bypass the 
established exchanges, and reduce transactions costs. For some institutions, the established 
exchange may no longer be the market predominantly chosen for trading in its listed securities. 
The principal choices an exchange makes that affect the attractiveness of the market to 
institutions are its market structure and its trading rules. Knowing which rules and which 
market structures appeal to which investor segments and for what reasons is crucial to exchange 
planning as institutional trading alternatives grow, and as investors' demand for trading services 
change. 
We examined these issues in interviews with a range of market participants, and solicited 
their views on the current state of London's equities markets. We find that the LSE faces 
growing threats to its ability to serve as the focal point for investors' trading activities, and that 
it can prepare itself better to address the needs of investors. The Exchange's present position 
is remarkably strong, and at present the trading services provided by LSE member firms are 
meeting the needs of institutions, which are not likely to move their trading away from the LSE. 
However, this position is due in part to the fact that most member firms are not earning an 
adequate return for their risks, expertise, and commitment of capital. They are, in effect, 
subsidizing investors' market activities. When LSE member firms are no longer willing or able 
to continue this subsidy, transactions costs will rise, and the Exchange will face a weakening of 
its position with investors. 
3.1. Customer Evaluations of the LSE We solicited opinions on what an established, and 
regulated exchange provides to investors, what off-exchange alternative mechanisms offer, and 
why have they not been more successful than they have been to date in London. We find fund 
managers are content, indifferent toward the Exchange, favor liquidity to trade publication, and 
do not regard the choice of trading venue of non-U.K. shares - SEAQI or home market - to 
be vitally important. 
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Content. Institutional investors are satisfied with the SEAQ market. Most concurred 
with a Bank of England study that concluded that trading cost are low and the regulatory regime 
is not onerous in  ond don.* A major London-based investment manager identified a legal record 
of the trade, and the traceability of transactions as part of the inducement to use the Exchange. 
Although this manager crosses some trades internally between portfolios, the price is verified 
in the market, a contract note written, and stamp duty paid. Asked about their trading via any 
off-exchange market alternatives, the head trader said it "was too small to mention." A senior 
fund manager and head trader of another institution agreed that "the drive to lower transactions 
costs is not significant here", and stated "we don't expect to go direct to other institutions for 
trading," A director of a major market making firm told us that "performance measurement was 
becoming visible among their institutional customers, but that little attraction currently existed 
to off-exchange systems." The availability of immediacy and continuity from SEAQ market 
makers led a senior executive at one institution to point out that it is "less time consuming for 
us and other institutions to use the intermediaries." 
Indifferent. Institutional investors are generally indifferent toward the Exchange. A 
major European fund manager in London explained that: 
"Trading is a minuscule part of our business. The LSE is just there to fulfill a 
function and offer its SEAQ screen. It's what the brokers provide us - research, 
dealing skill, etc. - that leads to our activities there. The LSE is not providing 
US a service." 
In a published interview, Dean LeBaron of Batterymarch Financial Management echoed 
that sentiment for the U,S, : 
"Most investors with the tools and sophistication will want to go to the place 
where the market is the deepest, wherever it may be. . . . We trade indifferently 
and if a market is competitive, more trades will take place there. We are looking 
for natural buyers and natural sellers to be brought together effi~iently."~ 
Reported in Cochrane, MI. "London is Top Centre for Foreign Share Deals", Financial 
Times, 13 May 1991, p 4. 
Wayne, L. "All-Night Trading Called Beneficial", New York Times, 26 June 1990, p. 
D5. 
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Favor Liquidity over Transparency and Trade Publication. Most U.K. institutions 
believe they are sophisticated enough to read the LSE market accurately. If forced to choose, 
institutions favor liquidity via market maker commitment of capital to immediate trade 
publication. One pension fund executive in London told us "as a large institutions we have clout 
and we choose liquidity at all times - we want to shift large parcels of stock and publication 
is not a major concern." One investor recognized this was "implicit collusion between the 
institution wanting to move a large position and the market maker. " Without trade publication, 
the investor did not feel severely disadvantaged: "we know the average large trade is from 
another institution, and we feel as knowledgeable as they." 
Trade Venue for Non-UX: Stocks was not a Major Consideration. In the choice 
between SEAQI and the stock's home market, institutions had little preference for one over the 
other. One investor noted, "we may not actually know where the deal gets done." Finding the 
best price was considered the role of the agency broker, although investors felt that the brokers' 
performance needs to be monitored. Brokers are more decisive in their choice of market, and 
one U.S. broker based in London said, "we want to use the real (home) market and be able to 
watch the market we trade in." 
3.2. Assessment of Customer Satisfaction. The current transactions costs of trading on the 
ISE are comparable to the lowest available on any major market. Low-cost transactions for 
institutional bargains mean that there is little potential savings to trading away from LSE. 
However, the continuing and well-publicized difficulties with Taurus indicate settlement and 
clearing inefficiencies in London are not likely to be reduced soon. Settlement is often referred 
to as the "glue" that holds some exchanges together, and the LSE's settlement process is 
comparatively expensive. One of the institutions mentioned that they had sent an operations 
manager to the Fidelity initiative for a real-time institutional trade confirmation system, and 
agreed that adding prices to such a system was feasible and "the Stock Exchange should be 
worried. " 
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Since the LSE and the NYSE markets have been deregulated and open to outside entry 
and competition for five and sixteen years respectively, a useful comparison for SEAQ dealing 
costs is the costs of trading in New York. 
Pagano and Roe11 (1989), p. 83 and p. 9 1, and [BID9 11. 
Dimensional Fund Advisors, Presentation at Conference on New Equity Trading 
Alternatives, New York, NY, February 1989. 
Average 
Spreads 
0.80 % 
1.13 96 
1.49% 
0.23 % 
London Stock Exchange: 
Trading Category 
Former Alpha: Top 150 
stocks 
Fonner Beta: Second 350 
stocks 
SEAQI: 16 stocks in French 
Sector 
Average institutional 
commission (1990)6 
Quality of Markets Report, Transactions Survey, London Stock Exchange, 1990. 
Chan and Lakonishok (1991) sampled 1.2 million transactions with a value of $387.6 
billion by 37 equities fund managers. Simple average commission was 0.23%. The median 
trade value was $93,075, and represented 2% of normal daily trading volume in the stock 
traded. The average trade value was $319,375, or almost 7% of normal daily trading volume. 
Hence the typical institutional trade is not a major event in the daily trading of most stocks. For 
stocks in the sample in the lowest quartile of trading volume, the median trade was somewhat 
more substantial, representing 24 % of normal daily volume. 
Average 
Spread4 
0.84% (1989) 
0.9% (1991) 
2.57% (1989) 
4.3% (1991) 
1.52 % (1989) 
0.16 % 
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Average institutional commission 
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average share price = $36.507 
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Comparable data on U.S. bid-ask spreads also comes from a separate study of bid-ask 
spreads in the U.S. for generally larger stocks in the S&P500 index and those not in the index 
for 1982 and 198tL8 Sample sizes are in parentheses: 
Transactions costs in London are roughly equal to those in New York, and compare 
favorably with those in other European centers (See [PAGAgO], p. 78.). The cost of a round- 
trip transaction (buying and later selling the stock) is the bid-ask spread plus two commissions, 
and New York and London costs for the most active shares average about 1.2%-1.4% of the 
price of the security. For less actively traded shares, costs can rise to 3 to 5 percent. As has 
been well publicized in London, trading in the former gammas, the least active share category, 
imposes costs as high as 10 percent [BID91]. Since institutional activity is highest as a 
proportion of total activity in actively traded, high capitalization companies, the most relevant 
c~mparison is in the actively traded category, in which London's institutional trading costs are 
low. 
- 
4. Supply of Trading Services 
A growing number of alternative trading systems have been introduced in recent years 
in the U.S. and Europe. These systems offer lower cost, off-exchange execution and enable 
institutions to trade directly with one another. Alternative market mechanisms threaten to draw 
significant proportions of trading volume away from established exchange markets. 
Year 
1982 
1988 
Sametz, A., Institutional Investing, Salomon Brothers Center, New York University, 
1991, p. 187. 
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0.97% (238) 
0.86% (283) 
Non-S&PSOO Stocks 
1.61% (338) 
1.96% (293) 
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Ariel, an inter-institutional trading system, was introduced in the U.K. in 1974. Activity 
on Ariel never reached a significant level, and the initiative was phased out shortly. A London 
fund manager familiar with Ariel, said "there was not enough client (institutional) liquidity to 
make it successful. An active market will itself initiate trades, but Ariel was never active." 
Until recently, there have not been any visible initiatives for electronic, inter-institutional order 
exposure and trading in the U.K. since Ariel. The recent introduction of U.K. versions of 
successful U.S. off-exchange trading systems - Posit and Instinet - has once again provided 
institutions with an opportunity to trade away from the LSE. Although the impact of off- 
exchange systems in London may not yet be as evident as in the U.S., this should not justify 
complacency. U.K. securities firms already trade actively in the shares in certain British 
companies away from the Exchange in ADR form,9 and the pricing of U.K. equities dealing 
services below cost may not endure, leading to greater volumes of off-exchange trading as a way 
of reducing institutional transactions costs. lo 
U.S. Experience. In the U.S., there appears to be elasticity of demand for transactions; at 
lower costs, investors submit more orders to trade. A managing director of a major institutional 
brokerage house in New York remarked that "institutions are so cost-conscious they'll bypass 
the floor and us any way they can to trade directly with each other. " This particularly applies 
to index portfolio trades that are informationless, but that improve a fund's cash and asset 
balance. One of the largest pension fund managers in the U.S. uses active management for only 
7% of its U.S. equities portfolio, and pointed out that "the lion's share of our trading now is 
over electronic systems, and if we had to pay full freight (about 5-10 cents) we would not do 
the trades. Our commission is at most 2 cents per share this way, and if it were 5 cents the 
strategy would be unprofitable." 
ADRs representing about 60 million shares in British companies trade daily in U.S. 
markets. Maher, P. "Inside the Strange World of ADRs", Investment Dealers Digest, 4 
November 1991, pp. 14-18. 
lo See Muehring, K. "A Trader's Trader Attempts a Final Turn", Institutional Investor, 
January 1992, pp. 54-58, for background on several independent initiatives for off-exchange 
trading in the U.K. 
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Alternative trading mechanisms have long existed in the U.S., but only recently have they 
captured a significant proportion of order flow. As recently as 1980, the NYSE had 88% of the 
trading volume in its listed stocks." The rest was regional exchange volume and trading by 
upstairs dealers. In the last 10 years the advent of program trading (trades involving baskets of 
10 or more stocks), and passive or quantitative fund management have led to the rapid 
development of fourth (disintermediated, inter-institutional) markets, and the growth of overseas 
trading volumes of U.S. stock by institutions and brokers. London, Amsterdam, Tokyo, each 
report trading volume in their cross-listed U.S. stocks. An explanation commonly given is that 
most trades are arranged crosses and that overseas trades are useful for avoiding U S .  exchange 
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restrictions on short-selling, and the possibility of the trade being broken-up by limit orders if 
routed to a U.S. exchange floor. 
Table 1 
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OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING ALTERNATIVES IN THE U.S. 
Examples (Introduction date) - Pricing, 
Owner, Daily Trading Volume estimates 
TYP 
Crossing Network i Batch trading based on closing prices i The Crossing Network (1986) - Run by 
1 from NYSE or mid-spread of NASDAQ f Reuters, 1 cent per share, 3 million shares 
.................................................. :..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
i Call auction. Price set by intersection SPAWorks (1991) - 0.8 cents per share. 45 
Single Price Auction of supply and demand curves from f institutions, 200,000 shares 
f submitted orders 
......................................................................................................... .................................................. 2 .......................................................................................... : 
i Use volume weighted average price of Posit (1986) - 2 cents per share. Run by 
Portfolio Crossing ! day's trading. Trades in morning and j Jefferies, used by 80 institutions managing 
f around noon. i 80% of US pension fund assets. Traders must 
f enter orders for at least 10 stocks. 3 million 
f shares 
............................................................................................ ................................................  : : ......................................................................................................... 
f Instinet (1969) - Run by Reuters, 1 cent per 
j share, 13 million shares 
Order Matching i Continuous open order book for i Quantex (1990) - Run by Jefferies, used by 
f individual shares or portfolios f 30 institutions, 1 million shares 
f Matchplus (199 1) - Run by Morgan Stanley, 
f 200,000 shares 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
! SEAQ International, U.S. Section (1985) - 
International Off- ! Screen display of market-makers' f indicative quotes, 5-10 million shares 
Hours Markets f quotes for U.S.-listed stocks f NASDAQ (January 1992) - 3:30 am to 9:00 
1 am N.Y. time, firm quotes, 100,000 shares 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
NYSE Responses ! 
i Enter orders from 4:15 pm to 5:00 pm, f Member firms enter orders from institutional 
Crossing Session I j to cross at NYSE closing price at 5:00 1 clients, 8.5 million shares entered per night 
f pm f with 10% executing 
................................................................................................................................... "" ............................................................................................................... 
Crossing Session I1 f Paired (prearranged) orders for 15 or j 
! more stocks with value greater than $1 ! 805,000 shares per night 
million are executed when received f 
Operates from 4:00 pm to 5: 15 pm. 
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The following graph indicates the approximate value of trading for off-exchange trading 
systems in the U.S. For comparison, the average daily trading value in 199 1 on NYSE was 
$6.0 billion, and on NASDAQ $2.6 billion.12 
TRADING VALUE ON OFF-EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
Daily -- 199 1 Data 
$300.0 
TCN Posit Quantex 
c%w'x% 
Match+ SPAWorks 
Listed Slocks vfi, NASDAQ/OTC stocks 
The next graph indicates how the trading volume of NYSE-listed stocks is distributed. 
Most troubling for established exchanges, the fastest growing segments of trading volume in the 
U.S. are the fourth market (inter-institutional order matching and crossing systems) and the third 
market (off-exchange market making by securities houses). Reuters' fourth market offerings - 
Instinet and The Crossing Network - allow for direct institution-to-institution trading, and grew 
an average 45 % annually between 1986 and 199 1, compared to less than 10% for the aggregate 
trading volume of the NYSE and NASDAQ markets. If current growth trends were to continue, 
the NYSE will account for less than half of trading volume in its own listed stocks by 1997. 
l2 Investor Activity Report, Securities Industry Association, New York, NY, 3 January 
1992. 
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Market Share of Tradin Volume 
NYSE-Listed Equities - 3Q $ 99 1 
Regiomls (9.9%) 
, NAS0/3rd Market (6.6%) 
The lesson from the U.S. is that exchanges must recognize the demand trends for trading 
services, and work to encompass and bring together all order flow to the benefit of all market 
participants. A New York-based broker felt that "with the order flow all over the place, the 
established market sees fewer and more difficult trades ... it is best for everyone if the order 
flow centralizes." Alternative, off-exchange trading mechanisms that offer lower costs and mid- 
spread trading will continue to be introduced, and continue threatening to draw order flow away 
from the central market. An exchange's response should be to preempt these alternatives by 
offering a ranging of linked trading mechanisms, including competing market maker quotes, 
limit order facilities, and periodic crossings. Keeping order flow from deserting an exchange 
requires augmenting the market structure with alternative, lower-cost trading mechanisms. In 
London this entails making innovative and ground-breaking modifications to the U E  market 
structure in the near future. These enhancements are as necessary for the Exchange's survival 
as the Big Bang changes made in 1986. 
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5. The Changing Demand for Trading Services 
Fund management has been transformed by the introduction of indexation and passive 
investing. In addition, computerized research databases and real-time market price data have 
enabled institutions to conduct extensive analyses, and select over- and under-valued companies. 
Institutions' demand for trading services will increasingly reflect their chosen management 
approaches. Since markets offer alternatives such as continuous vs. periodic trading, negotiation 
vs. automated execution, and differing degrees of quote and transaction visibility, exchange 
planners need to understand which trading mechanisms appeal to which investor segments. 
The Passive-Active split. In the late 1960s, several detailed studies of the investment 
performance of fund managers made clear that the majority were generally unable to achieve 
even the returns registered on the benchmark unmanaged indexes of the market. Malkie1's.A 
Random Walk Down Wall Street (1973) popularized the notion that active stock picking was 
unlikely to lead to performance that is consistently better than the return on the market. In fact, 
because active managers trade their portfolios more aggressively, they incur greater costs, 
making it more likely that they will underperform. In addition, ERISA legislation enacted in 
the U.S. in 1974 made pension plan sponsors responsible for ensuring cost-effective investment 
management. 
Passive Management. Indexation and low-cost passive investing have been the response 
to fund manager underperformance, and these have become increasingly popular in the 1980s. 
Such strategies create information-free trades, which are not time-sensitive. Today, estimates 
are that between 30 and 35 percent of institutional equity holdings in the U.S. are passively 
managed index matching funds.' A September 1989 survey13 of 36 of the largest U.S. pension 
funds with assets totaling $259 billion found 34% of their domestic equities holdings were 
indexed, a 4% increase from 1986. Matching an unmanaged market index demands a low-cost 
l3 Committee on Investment of Employee Benefits, "Survey of Pension Fund Investment 
Practices'!, Financial Executives Institute, Morristown, NJ, 1990. 
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trading strategy, and requires less turnover than active management. The respondents reported 
the following turnover rates for their portfolios: 
CIEBA Survey of 36 U.S. Pension Funds - - - -  1986 1987 1988 1989 
Assets Managed in Market IndexIPassive Strategies 30% 30% 31% 34% 
Turnover Rates of U.S. Equity Portfolios 
Passive 19% 24% 15% 13% 
Active 56% 66% 48% 47% 
TOTAL 46% 51% 38% 31% 
Passively managed portfolios are suited to computerized periodic auction markets for 
either individual stocks or baskets of stocks. Trades are generated not by market or 
informational events, but by the need to manage cash flows and periodic rebalancings. Since 
there is no informational motivation, there is no time urgency, and thus no need to pay for 
immediate execution and market makers' commitment of risk capital. As a result, "by some 
estimates, as much as 90% of the major index funds' trading (in the U.S.) is done either 
internally or through off-exchange  system^"'^ 
Active Management. Trading is principally driven by the stock selection function of active 
fund managers. Most institutions that are active managers feel they distinguish themselves on 
the basis of investment strategy, with low trading cost a secondary consideration. One London 
fund manager referring to the organization's actively managed portfolio remarked "we are not 
worried the odd l p  or 2p (in trading costs)." In addition, information technology has enabled 
investors to receive more real-time market data, and has facilitated "hair-trigger" trading for 
hedging and arbitrage strategies. These informationally-motivated trades demand greater 
immediacy and are more time-sensitive. The current London Stock Exchange market structure 
l4 Anders G. and Torres, C. "As Computers Bypass Middlemen on Wall Street, 
Controversy Stirs", Wall Street Journal, 2 September 199 1, p. 9. 
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provides the greatest support for active institutional fund managers, who will pay for member 
firms' brokerage and market maker services even at prices that represent their full cost. 
6.  Threats to London Stock Exchange Market 
There are a number of regulatory threats to the position of the London Stock Exchange 
in Europe. The European Commission's draft investment services directive was identified as 
potentially being used to force all European stocks to be traded the same way under the same 
regulations. London's international equities market has succeeded on the basis of market maker 
capital commitment and relative regulatory laxity, and the LSE could be hurt by a formal 
sanctioning of trading using only continental European auction market structures. In addition 
to the decreased role of dealers in continental European markets, 43 % of equity trading does not 
take place on stock markets at all, and is not reported to market authorities." Thus, the 
liberalization of Europe may lead to SEAQI business repatriating to home market. 
Observers have identified several inadequacies in the current market structure that may 
expose the Exchange to challenges from off-exchange alternatives. Due to the preferencing of 
order flow,16 the most willing market maker may not receive orders, damaging the central price 
discovery function of London's quote-driven market. In addition, due to the amount of trading 
that takes place inside the SEAQ touch, several prices may exist for what is ostensibly the same 
trade. This demonstrates at least some degree of market fragmentation on the LSE. The 
inconsistency of the market makers' services was also noted by one London institution: you 
"don't get the prices you expect in difficult and uncertain times." 
l5 Water, R. "Bourses Build Up Defences", Financial Times, 24 September 1991, p. 17. 
l6 Preferencing occurs when a market maker not on the SEAQ touch receives investors' 
orders and executes trades at the touch price or a negotiated price. Because of preferencing, a 
touch market maker, who is obligated (in shares with firm quotes) to trade at the inside price, 
will not necessarily be rewarded with order flow for the added risk taken by posting better, 
inside prices. Data on the extent of preferencing in the LSE market was reported in [CLEM89]. 
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London's unique attraction is capital commitment, but some withdrawal from market 
making has occurred since 1987. In spite of the withdrawals, the remaining dealers' gross 
margin (dealing revenue i trading volume) in U.K. equities fell from 0.10% in 1989 to 0.06% 
in 1990, while the industry return on capital dropped from 15.9 % to -1 1.1 % in the same period. 
Capital employed by member firms fell from its 1989 peak of £3.5 billion to £3.1 billion in late 
1990.17 Removal of market makers' privileges such as stamp duty exemption and stock 
borrowing may further reduce members' willingness to commit their own capital to facilitating 
customer trades. 
Derivatives and equities surrogates are becoming more popular, and may accelerate the 
trend toward patient, less-time sensitive trading. A trader can acquire positions rapidly in 
derivatives, and can be more patient executing orders in the underlying stocks. Warrants and 
futures are often traded over-the-counter, and can be used to replicate or synthesize the 
performance of a portfolio of the underlying securities, thus reducing the need to trade through 
a traditional stock exchange mechanism. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The current structure of the LSE market is well-suited to the demands of active fund 
managers, who seek to outperform market indexes on the basis of superior research and stock 
selection. Active managers need to trade rapidly and will pay for market makers' commitment 
of capital and for the services of a broker in executing trades. Passive fund managers have less 
time-sensitive trading needs, and are motivated to lower trading costs to improve their 
performance relative to the benchmark index they are tracking. Early adopters of off-exchange, 
inter-institutional trading systems in London are thus likely to be passive managers who have 
patient trading strategies and would benefit most from minimum commission, mid-spread 
transactions. 
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At present, all institutional trades executed in the London Stock Exchange require time- 
sensitivity costs and risks to be borne by Exchange members. No opportunity exists for 
institutional investors to submit orders for shares and portfolios to a lower-cost trading 
mechanism and to avoid paying for unnecessary immediacy. With just a single channel for all 
trading, potential patient and informationless traders subsidize time-sensitive traders. Since 
member firms services are not covering their costs, the LSE has been pressured to adopt market 
rule changes to restore profitability. 
Information and communications technology has eroded exchange monopolies and 
facilitated new off-exchange trading alternatives. Fund management developments have led to 
the growth of more patient strategies and changed demands for trading services. The effect of 
these pressures on the LSE will be increasingly evident. Without a response and enhancements 
to the current market structure, the Exchange faces the prospect of erosion of its central market 
position, deterioration of market quality, and falling trading volumes. Fortunately, institutions 
are presently content with the trading services available in the LSE market, and the Exchange 
is in a strong position to move forward again, and reinforce the strengths of its market position 
in U.K. and international equities trading. 
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